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COMMENT
ANNEXATION BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Problems caused by the growth of urban fringe areas have increased,
particularly since World War II. As the population of these areas in-
creases, so does the need for public services and the attendant need for
effective local government. County government in Washington has re-
mained generally unchanged since its inception one hundred years ago.
Conceived in contemplation of a rural, lightly populated area requiring
only a minimum of services, county government was not designed to
deal with urban problems. As a result, the task of providing govern-
mental services has been assumed by existing municipalities, which, in
order to gain the requisite jurisdiction over fringe areas, must annex
them. Annexation often brings higher taxes, zoning restrictions, and
other municipal control, causing dissention among the inhabitants of
the area proposed to be annexed.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss certain problems and con-
siderations raised by annexation, with particular emphasis upon the
applicable Washington law. The comment is divided into a discussion
of five general areas: 1) The procedure for accomplishing annexation;
2) Land which may properly be annexed; 3) Remedies available for
attacking annexation; 4) Circumstances in which annexation may be
collaterally attacked; and 5) The doctrine of de facto corporation.
1 In three situations, the annexation of unlimited area which is contiguous and
unicorporated is contemplated:
1. RCW 35.13.015-resolution method-initiated by legislative body of the annexing
municipality.
2. RCW 35.13.020-.120-election method-initiated by qualified voters residing in
the area proposed to be annexed.
3. RCW 35.13.130-.170--petition method-initiated by owners of property in area
proposed to be annexed.
Six statues deal with special circumstances:
4. RCW 35.10.010-consolidation of contiguous cities or towns.
5. RCW 35.11.010-third class city or town contiguous to first class city.
6. RCW 35.13.180-contiguous or non-contiguous territory to third class city or
town, for municipal purposes.
7. RCW 35.13.190-federal land, contiguous and unincorporated, by municipalities
other than of the first class, limited to four miles.
8. RCW 35.13.185-federal land, contiguous and unincorporated, by first class cities,
without limitation.
9. RCW 35.12-all or part of another city or suburb with not over 2,000 inhabitants
or any unincorporated territory, initiated by voters of municipality.
For an outline of procedure to be followed in some of these situations, see BuRanu oF
GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH & SERVIcES, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, HANDBOOK FOR
WASHINGTON THInD CLASS CITIES, Rept. No. 134 (1956).
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION
PROCEDURE
Washington statutes provide for the annexation of territory in nine
different situations.' They provide four methods for initiating annexa-
tion proceedings, three of which are more often used:2
Resolution Method.3 The legislative body of a municipality may file
a copy of a resolution to annex with the Board of County Commis-
sioners.
Election Method.' RCW 35.10, 35.11 and 35.12 require a petition
signed by qualified voters of the municipality, equal in number to one-
fifth of the votes cast at the last municipal election, to be filed with the
municipality's legislative body. RCW 35.13.020-.120 requires a peti-
tion signed by qualified voters resident of the proposed territory, equal
to twenty percent of the votes cast at the last general election, to be
filed with the Board of County Commissioners, provided it has been
first filed and approved by the annexing municipality.
Unlike the petition method, both the resolution and the election
methods require an annexation election. RCW 35.10 and 35.12 submit
the question to the inhabitants of the municipality as well as those of
the territory proposed to be annexed. RCW 35.11, 35.13.015, and
35.13.020-.120 permit a vote by only the inhabitants of the territory
proposed to be annexed.
Petition Method.5 A petition, signed by landowners whose property
holdings constitute not less than seventy-five percent of the assessed
value of the territory proposed to be annexed, may be filed with the
legislative body of the annexing municipality. Following a public
hearing and approval, the municipality may pass an ordinance annex-
ing the territory.
After the annexation proceedings have been initiated by one of the
preceding methods, the following steps are usually taken: (Since the
steps taken pursuant to other chapters are similar, those required by
RCW 35.13 are used as examples.)
1. The petition must pass the approval of a review board, called to
determine whether the annexation is in the public interest.6
2. Following the review board's approval, a hearing on the petition
2 The fourth method (RCW 35.13.180-.190) permits limited annexation of territory
for municipal purposes or from the federal government by simply passing an ordinance.
3 RCW 35.13.015.
4 RCW 35.10; RCW 35.11; RCW 35.12; RCW 35.13.020-.120.
S RCW 35.13.130-.170.
6 RCW 35.13.171-.174.
19621
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
for annexation is called and notice of it is published in a newspaper
printed and published in the annexing municipality. If the petition
complies with the requirements of law, it is approved and a date for
election is set. (Under the petition method, the next step is number
six.)'
3. Notice of election is given by posting in four public places within
the area to be annexed, and publication for at least two weeks prior
to the date of election in a newspaper printed and published within the
limits of the territory proposed to be annexed, or if there is no such
newspaper, a newspaper published in the municipality, or if there is
none, a newspaper of general circulation published in the county.'
4. An election is held in accordance with general election laws in
which only qualified or registered voters may participate.'
5. The returns are canvassed. They are transmitted to the legisla-
tive body of the annexing municipality."0
6. The municipality adopts an ordinance annexing the territory."
ANNExABLE LAND
Municipal corporations' power to annex is derived from the legis-
lature. 2 Since the Washington Constitution prohibits special legisla-
tion, Washington annexation laws are very broad and ambiguous, and
their requisites for annexability can only be determined by resort to a
study of the applicable case law. The various judicial interpretations
of the statutory requisites to annexabiity are discussed in this section.
As a general rule, territory may be annexed if it shares a unity of
interest with the annexing municipality so as to form a community.
Annexation resulting in a plurality of interests is undesirable since
the existence of divergent factors weakens effective municipal govern-
ment and detracts from the benefits to be gained from annexation.
Contiguity. Generally, only territory which is adjacent or contiguous
to a municipality may be annexed. Courts have enforced this require-
ment, even where it is not expressly set out by statute.' With one
7 RCW 35.13.040.
8 RCW 35.13.080.
9 RCW 35.13.070.
10 RCW 35.13.090-.100.
11 RCW 35.13.100.
12 WAsH. CONST. art. XI, § 10, which states that municipal corporations shall be
subject to and controlled by general laws, provides the manner in which the legislature
may grant such power.
is McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 104 At. 540 (1918).
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exception, 4 Washington statutes limit annexation to contiguous terri-
tory -' The definition of contiguity includes both physical contiguity
and homogeniety. Tracts are generally required to be so situated with
reference to the municipality that they may reasonably be expected
to receive the ordinary benefits of local government. It is also generally
required that they be reached without traveling outside of the municipal
boundaries."
It is sufficient if all of the tracts to be annexed are contiguous to
each other and one of them is contiguous to the municipality." How-
ever, where annexation of one tract, contiguous to another tract, the
annexation of which is not yet completed, is attempted, courts have dif-
fered in their conclusions as to whether it is sufficiently contiguous for
annexation purposes. The California court has held that such annexa-
tions are invalid because a California statute requires contiguity at the
time the petition is filed. 8
On the other hand, the Pennsylvania court has held an annexation
valid under circumstances in which an appeal concerning the first
annexation was pending at the conclusion of the subsequent annexation
proceedings.' Developing a theory of "intercontiguity," the court
recognized that the prior annexation had been affirmed on appeal, and
that the result was contiguity between the two territories and the
municipality, in fact. South Carolina concurs in the theory of intercon-
tiguity, provided the annexation proceedings are carried out simul-
taneously so that there is at no time a lack of contiguity. 0 Unlike Cali-
fornia, South Carolina had no statute requiring contiguity at the
time of filing the petition for annexation.
Should this problem arise in Washington, any solution will be com-
plicated by the inconsistent language of the Washington statutes.
RCW 35.13.010 states that "any portion of a county not incorporated
as part of a city or town but lying contiguous thereto may become part
of the city or town by annexation," apparently requiring contiguity at
'4 RCV 35.13.180. "City and town councils of second and third class cities and towns
may by a majority vote annex new territory outside the city or town limits whether
contiguous or noncontiguous, for park, cemetary, or other municipal purposes."
15 RCV 35.10.010; RCW 35.11.010; RCW 35.12.010; RCW 35.13.015; RCW 35.13-
.020-.120; RCW 35.13.130-.170; RCW 35.13.185; RCW 35.13.190.
10 2 MNfCQUILLIN, MUNIcIPAL Co1oRATioNs § 7.20 (3d ed. 1949).
'7 Evansville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525 (1864) ; Hurla v. City of Kansas City, 46 Kan.
738, 27 Pac. 143 (1891).
I8 McDowell & Craig v. City of Santa Fe Springs, 54 Cal. 2d 33, 4 Cal. Rep. 176,
351 P.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal. 2d
888, 341 P.2d 325 (Sup. Ct 1958).
1 re Lancaster City Ord. No. 20-1952, 374 Pa. 543, 98 A.2d 33 (1953).
20 Tovey v. City of Charleston, 237 S.C. 475, 117 S.E.2d 872 (1961).
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the time of annexation. RCW 35.13.130, however, states that "a
petition for annexation of an area contiguous to a city or town may be
made in writing addressed to and filed with the legislative body to
which annexation is desired," apparently requiring contiguity at the
time the petition is filed. It is suggested that if the Washington court
were to face the problem, it would follow the reasoning of either the
Pennsylvania or the South Carolina court, unless the problem arises
out of circumstances similar to those under which the California cases
were decided. The California decisions were tempered by a judicial
attempt to slow down the rapid, competitive pace of annexations by
California municipalities at that time.
If land intervenes between the municipality and the territory to be
annexed, the territory is generally held not to be contiguous.2 Also,
where the territory and the municipality touch only at corners, and
persons cannot pass from one to the other without passing outside the
municipal boundaries, the tracts are not contiguous.2 Where rivers
intervene, courts have had little difficulty finding land on the opposite
bank to be contiguous because adequate means of communication and
a unity of interests ordinarily exist.23 Where these qualities are lacking,
however, as between tracts located on opposite sides of a bay, courts
have not found the requisite contiguity.' Washington statutes specifi-
cally provide that land shall be deemed contiguous, even though separ-
ated by water, or tide or shore lands on which no bona fide residence is
maintained.25 These statutes have never been interpreted in Washing-
ton. Although they appear to settle the question of contiguity conclu-
sively, it seems that the court would construe them in the light of the
communication and unity of interest requirements. It is suggested that
the statutes were intended to resolve the problem arising from the fact
that municipal boundaries located on a body of water may only front
the water.2 Without the statutes, whether land located on opposite
shores of an intervening body of water could be considered contiguous
21 Although no such provision has been found in the Washington statutes, the statutes
of some states define contiguity to permit the intervention of small parcels of land.
22 Wild v. People ex rel. Stephens, 227 Ill. 556, 81 N.E. 707 (1907); Linn County
Bank v. Hopkins, 47 Kan. 580, 28 Pac. 606 (1892).
23 Vestal v. City of Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321, 15 S.W. 891 (1891); McGraw v.
Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 104 Atl. 540 (1918) ; Tovey v. City of Charleston, 237 S.C.
475, 117 S.E.2d 872 (1961).
24 United States ex tel. Horigan v. Heyward, 98 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Ocean
Beach Heights, Inc. v. Brown Crummer Inv. Co., 87 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1937), rev'd,
302 U.S. 614 (1938).
25 RCW 35.10.010; RCW 35.13.010.
26 RCW 35.21.160 extends municipal jurisdiction over adjacent waters. See RHYNE,
MuNiciPIAL LAv § 2-30 (1957).
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would remain unsettled. Thus, they could be considered to be directed
only to the problem of physical contiguity.
Proposed annexations which would produce unusual configurations,
such as "shoestring" and "mushroom" effects, have received divergent
treatment by the courts. Representative of one approach, the Califor-
nia courts have ruled that the determination of boundaries is a political
and not a judicial question.17 They have decided that the only judicial
question is whether contiguity exists at any point. Following this
rationale, courts have allowed "shoestring"28 and "mushroom 2 9 effects,
and have sanctioned the occurrence of unincorporated islands, resulting
from municipalities surrounding but not annexing unincorporated ter-
ritory."0 Although there are no Washington cases considering this
question, the Attorney General has adopted a similar rule."' The Cali-
fornia legislature reacted to its court's ruling in 1951 and 1955 by
limiting the use of "strips""2 and by prohibiting the occurrence of unin-
corporated islands."
If there is a valid reason for annexations of this type, they should
be allowed. For example, in Village of Saranac Lake v. Gillispie,"4 the
court held that annexation of a disposal plant one-half mile away and
connected by a pipe under a ten foot strip of land was proper. Annex-
ation might also be reasonable where the unusual configurations have
27 People ex tel. Forde v. Town of Corte Madera, 115 Cal. App. 2d 32, 251 P.2d 988
(1952) ; City of Burlingame v. San Mateo County, 90 Cal. App. 2d 705, 203 P.2d 807
1949) ; People ex rel. Peck v. City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal. 220, 97 Pac. 311 (1908);
People ex reL Russell v. Town of Loyalton, 147 Cal. 774, 82 Pac. 620 (1905).
28 Park v. Hardin, 203 Ark. 1135, 160 S.W.2d 501 (1942) (four mile strip one-
quarter mile wide) ; People ex rel. Forde v. Town of Corte Madera, 115 Cal. App.
2d 32, 251 P.2d 988 (1952) (strip one mile long and one-hundred and fifty feet wide) ;
City of Burlingame v. San Mateo County, 90 Cal. App. 2d 705, 203 P.2d 807 (1949)(one-hundred foot wide strip in horseshoe shape enclosing an unincorporated island) ;
People ex rel. Peck v. City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal. 220, 97 Pac. 311 (1908) (sixteen
mile strip one mile wide).
20 Wild v. People ex rel. Stephens, 227 Ill. 556, 81 N.E. 707 (1907) (one-half mile
strip fifty feet wide connecting outlying lands) ; State ex rel. City of West Orange v.
City of Orange, 300 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (one mile strip of highway
used to connect territory) ; City of Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 182 S.W.2d
695 (1944) (airport three or four miles from city connected by annexed highway) ;
Lefler v. City of Dallas, 177 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (area connected by
three-quarter strip ten feet wide).
20 City of Burlingame v. San Mateo County, 90 Cal. App. 2d 705, 203 P.2d 807
(1949); Spaulding School Dist. v. City of Waukegan, 18 Ill. 2d 526, 165 N.E.2d 283
(1961).
21 Ops. Ai-r'Y GEN. 269 (Wash. 1951-53) (city may annex land one-half mile away
which is connected by a strip of land which is a highway).
2 CAL. Gov. CODE § 35002.5 (territory not contiguous if the only contiguity is based
on a strip over three-hundred feet long and less than two-hundred feet wide, such width
exclusive of highways).33 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 35158, 35326 (prohibiting annexations leaving unincorporated
islands).
34261 App. Div. 854, 24 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1941).
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been caused by natural land obstacles such as swamps or mountains.
However, unreasonable annexations of odd-shaped territory have been
noted as a subterfuge for defeating the homogeniety aspect of con-
tiguity- 5 The court in People v. Village of Streamwood" held that
the annexation of a maze of roads seventy-five miles in length was a
sham since the roads were not reasonably contiguous and because the
municipality could not reasonably serve the annexed area.
A judicial requirement of reasonable contiguity seems to be a better
solution than statutory limitation. As pointed out in one text,"7 the
California statutes limiting contiguity are too inflexible to cope with
every possible situation. Annexations similarly shaped and prompted
by similar motives may be accomplished under the present California
statute by juggling the shape slightly so as to defeat one requirement
of the limitation. Thus, a shoestring annexation 201 feet wide and
over 300 feet long is not controlled by the statute which states that
territory is not contiguous if based on a strip over 300 feet long and
less than 200 feet wide. 8 On the other hand, a judicial requirement
that there be reasonable contiguity can be more usefully applied to
accomplish desired annexations. In In re Westmoreland, Inc.,9 the Illi-
nois court followed a rule sufficiently flexible to permit a finding that
a strip of land shaped like a "C" was reasonably contiguous, since
touching the municipality for 660 feet was contiguity for a reasonable,
substantial distance.
Reasonableness. The concepts of contiguity and reasonableness run
hand in hand; land may not be annexed without the presence of both
aspects. Because annexed territory is subject to municipal controls and
taxes, annexation without justification is a denial of due process."'
Generally, annexation is not reasonable where the annexed territory will
35 Park v. Hardin, 203 Ark. 1135, 160 S.W.2d 501 (1942) ; Brown v. City Council
of Long Beach, 258 Pac. 693 (Cal. App. 1927) ; People ex reL. Lemoore Land & Fruit
Growing Co. v. City of Lemoore, 37 Cal. App. 79, 174 Pac. 93 (1918) ; People ex rel.
Adamowski v. Village of Streamwood, 15 Ill. 2d 595, 155 N.E.2d 635 (1959) ; Wild v.
People ex rel. Stephens, 227 Ill. 556, 81 N.E. 707 (1907) ; State ex ref. Danielsen v.
Village of Mound, 234 Minn. 531, 48 N.W.2d 855 (1951).
38 15 Ill. 2d 595, 155 N.E2d 635 (1959).
37 Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkley, Annexatiot?
Incorporation? A Guide for Community Action 28 (1959).38 CAL. Gov. CODE § 35002.5 (territory not contiguous if the only contiguity is based
on a strip over three-hundred feet long and less than two-hundred feet wide, such width
exclusive of highways).
39 15 Ill. 2d 51, 145 N.E.2d 257 (1957).
40 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. City of Silver Grove, 249 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Ky. 1952);
RHYNE, MuNIcIPAL LAW § 2-4 (1957).
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not receive a reciprocal benefit from annexation.4 Thus, where land
is separated by a body of water which substantially interferes with
communication, it is improper to annex it.,2 Annexation is also not
reasonable where land has been annexed for revenue purposes only,4"
or where a municipality already has a surplus of land used for munici-
pal purposes.4 On the other hand, territory may be annexed if it is
needed for municipal growth although it is now vacant, is farm land,
or would not receive benefit by annexation. 5
A special review board, composed of designated public officials and
convened by the mayor of the annexing municipality, is given the
duty of determining whether proposed unincorporated territory is
appropriate for annexation,"0 by RCW 35.13.171. The review board's
approval is a condition precedent to any action by the Board of County
Commissioners or municipality on a petition for an election to vote
upon annexation or for passage of an annexation ordinance. In 1961
the Washington legislature adopted the following factors as a guide,
not a limitation, on the review board's determination of whether the
proposed annexation is in the public interest:
1. The immediate and prospective populations of the area to be
annexed;
2. The assessed valuation of the area to be annexed, and its relationship
to population;
3. The history of and prospects for construction of improvements in
the area to be annexed;
4. The needs and possibilities for geographical expansion of the city;
5. The present and anticipated need for governmental services in the
41 City of Pine Bluff v. Mead, 177 Ark. 809, 7 S.W.2d 988 (1928) ; People ex rel.
Adamowski v. Village of Streamwood, 15 Ill. App. 2d 595, 155 N.E.2d 635 (1959);
State ex rel. Danielsen v. Village of Mound, 234 Minn. 531, 48 N.W.2d 855 (1951);
Drum v. University Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (1927).
42 Ocean Beach Heights, Inc. v. Brown Crummer Inv. Co., 87 F2d 978 (5th Cir.
1937), reV'd, 302 U.S. 614 (1938) ; Vestal v. City of Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321, 15 S.W.
891 (1891). Where there is a lack of unity because of intervening water, courts have
denied annexation on both the grounds of contiguity and reasonableness.
43 Drum v. University Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (1927).
4Incorporated Town of North Judson v. Chicago & E. Ry., 72 Ind. App. 550, 126
N.E. 323 (1920).
45 Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wn.2d 181, 324 P.2d 438 (1958); Drum v. Uni-
versity Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (1927) ; Frace v. City of
Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69, 47 Pac. 219 (1896) ; Ferguson v. City of Snohomish, 8 Wash.
668, 36 Pac. 969 (1894).
46 In annexations of other than unincorporated areas, as a practical matter the
question of reasonableness does not arise. For this reason, the proceedings are con-
ducted solely by the Board of County Commissioners or by the municipality. In these
circumstances, the question of reasonableness is usually inherent in the statute. For
example, RCW 35.13.172 dispenses with review when the area and the property val-
uations are below a certain limit.
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area proposed to be annexed, including but not limited to water
supply, sewage and garbage disposal, zoning, streets and alleys,
curbs, sidewalks, police and fire protection, playgrounds, parks,
and other municipal services, and transportation and drainage;
6. The relative capabilities of the city, county, and other political sub-
divisions to provide governmental services when the need arises;
7. The existence of school districts and special districts within the
area proposed to be annexed, and the impact of annexation upon
such districts;
8. The elimination of isolated unincorporated areas existing without
adequate economical governmental services;
9. The immediate and potential revenues that would be derived by the
city as a result of annexation, and their relation to the cost of
providing service to the area.47
Similar criteria have been judicially developed in other jurisdictions.' 8
Inter-County Annexation. RCW 35.13.010 permits "any portion of
a county not incorporated as a part of a city or town [to] . . . become
part of the city or town by annexation." The statute is ambiguous as to
whether municipalities are limited to the county in which they are situ-
ated or are permitted to annex territory in other counties. Other juris-
dictions have forbidden inter-county annexations."9 Allowing munici-
palities to extend their territory into multiple counties, it is argued,
multiplies inconveniences and governmental problems such as deter-
mining which Board of County Commissioners should be petitioned
for the annexation of territory located in the two counties. Also, muni-
cipalities should not be able to do by annexation what is not allowed
upon incorporation."
A Nebraska case,5 ' however, held that a statute limiting annexation
to contiguous territory was broad enough to allow inter-county annexa-
47 RCW 35.13.173.
48 Vestal v. City of Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321, 15 S.W. 891 (1891), states that territory
may be annexed in the following situations:
1. Territory platted and held for sale or use as town lots;
2. Territory, platted or not, held to be bought and sold as urban property when
values correspond;
3. Territory furnishing abode for densely settled community or representing
growth of the municipal corporation beyond its legal boundaries;
4. Territory needed for proper town purposes, i.e., streets, sewer, gas, water and
police protection;
5. Territory valuable for prospective urban uses except:
a. where used for agriculture and valuable because of that and not because of
its proximity to the municipal corporation;
b. vacant and without special value as being adaptable to a municipal cor-
poration.
49 County of San Mateo v. City Council of Palo Alto, 168 Cal. App. 2d 220, 335
P2d 1013 (1959) ; Tabor & N. Ry. v. Dyson, 86 Iowa 310, 53 N.W. 245 (1892) ; Town
of Elsmere v. Tanner, 245 Ky. 376, 53 S.W.2d 522 (1932).50 Tabor & N. Ry. v. Dyson, 86 Iowa 310, 53 N.W. 245 (1892).
5' Village of Wakefield v. Utecht, 90 Neb. 252, 133 N.W. 240 (1911).
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tions without special legislative approval. Similarly, Washington
statutes show no legislative intention to forbid inter-county annexa-
tions." RCW 35.04.010 permits the incorporation of inter-county
municipalities; RCW 35.04.180 permits consolidation and annexation
by municipalities--whether the territory lies in one or more counties.
It follows logically that the Washington legislature also intends to
approve of inter-county annexations by single county municipalities.
Concurrent Jurisdiction. It is a generally recognized principle that
two municipalities cannot exercise the same or similar powers, privi-
leges, or jurisdiction over the same territory at the same time." When
a proceeding for the annexation of a given area has been initiated, such
area cannot during the process be separately incorporated. 4 Further,
when a certain area is in the process of incorporation, it cannot be
annexed by a municipality until after the incorporation proceeding is
terminated." 5
RCW 35.13.050 and RCW 35.13.175 are the only statutes which
state when a proceeding has commenced so as to prevent other munici-
palities from proceeding to annex the same territory. They provide that
upon the filing of a petition or a resolution with the Board of County
Commissioners, the Board and other public officials shall not act upon
subsequent petitions or resolutions. However, these statutes are limited
to annexation proceedings. Therefore, at some future date Washington
must determine the point at which incorporation proceedings have
commenced sufficiently to preclude other municipalities from acting.
Legislation is needed to express, for example, whether an incorporation
proceeding commences upon the filing of a petition for election or
during the period of its circulation. A possible solution would be to
deem proceedings commenced upon the first signing of a petition or
resolution. A petition not filed within six months could be declared
void, as has been done in California." This solution would neither
punish prompt petitioners nor allow them to unreasonably delay pro-
ceedings.
AVAILABLE REMEDIES FOR ATTACKING ANNEXATION
Quo Warranto. Quo warranto is often said to be the proper remedy
62 0ps. ATT'Y GEN. 37 (Wash. 1959-60).
53 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNIcipAL CORPORATIONS § 3.02 (3d ed. 1949); 1 DLLON, MUNI-
cIPAL CoRPoRATioNs § 354 (5th ed. 1911).
'.' People ex rel. City of Pasadena v. City of Monterey Park, 40 Cal. App. 715, 181
Pac. 825 (1919).
55 1 MCQUILIN, op. cit. .rtpraz note 53, at § 7.22.
51 CAL. Gov. CODE § 35001.
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for attacking the validity of an annexation."7 Since it is a state action,
it is a direct attack, as distinguished from a collateral attack, 8 and,
except for statutory prohibitions, may be used to attack annexations
regardless of the existence of a de facto corporation. Very few cases
deal squarely with the question of whether quo warranto is the proper
proceeding or whether the state has capacity to bring it, but the rule is
often stated as a dictum. 9 However, since municipal corporations
obtain their existence from the state, it is logical that the state should
be competent to question the validity of their acts.
Quo warranto is properly employed only where annexation proceed-
ings are completed, while other remedies must be used where the pro-
ceedings are incomplete or still pending. 0 A state cannot question by
what authority a municipal corporation acts until it has completed the
annexation proceedings and has attempted to act by asserting jurisdic-
tion over its territory.
For the individual, the disadvantage of quo warranto as a remedy
is its discretionary character. The Attorney General must be convinced
that he is justified in maintaining the quo warranto proceeding before
he will bring it." In addition, the courts must be shown that there is
sufficient public interest in the proceeding to prevent it from being
barred. RCW 7.56.020, which states that a person, in his own relation,
may bring quo warranto whenever he claims an interest in the corpora-
tion, does not apply when challenging the validity of an annexation.
The person, by bringing the information, denies the existence of the
requisite "interest." For these reasons, other remedies are sought to
attack the validity of an annexation.
Injunction. The most frequently used remedy is the injunction. It
may be used where the annexation proceedings are incomplete or still
pending as well as where the proceedings are complete but the munici-
pality has not attempted to exercise its jurisdiction. It may not,
however, be used where a de facto corporation exists. The use of
injunctions and restraining orders has been permitted in Washington,
57 American Distilling Co. v. City Council of Sausalito, 34 Cal. 2d 660, 213 P.2d
704 (1950) ; State ex tel. Harrington v. City of Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610
(1939) ; State ex tel. Burnquist v. Village of North Pole, 213 Minn. 297, 6 N.W.2d
458 (1942) ; Lefler v. City of Dallas, 177 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
58 Ibid.
59American Distilling Co. v. City Council of Sausalito, 34 Cal. 2d 660, 213 P.2d
704 (1950); Kuhn v. City of Port Townsend, 12 Wash. 605, 41 Pac. 923 (1895);
Ferguson v. City of Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 36 Pac. 969 (1894).60 American Distilling Co. v. City Council of Sausalito, supra note 59.
61 State ex rel. Cummings v. Blackwell, 91 Wash. 81, 157 Pac. 223 (1916).62 Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 316, 126 Pac. 628, 637 (1912).
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to prevent the issuance and sale of bonds62 and a tax levy,"3 both of
which were the municipality's first exertion of jurisdiction after the
completion of the annexation proceedings, and against the canvassing
of election returns," which was a step in the annexation process.
Timely injunctions were permitted, in these cases, to challenge both
the authority to annex and procedural irregularities. As evidenced by
their frequent use, courts freely entertain injunction proceedings. This
is probably because often no other remedy is available until the pro-
ceedings are completed, 5 and after the proceedings are completed,
except for quo warranto, the petitioner is virtually without recourse.
Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari. As is an injunction, manda-
mus, prohibition and certiorari are collateral remedies and may be
brought under the same limited circumstances.6 Mandamus and pro-
hibition are proper remedies to compel the termination of annexation
proceedings prior to the time that quo warranto becomes available; 67
certiorari is the proper remedy to test the validity of the annexation
proceedings and the jurisdiction of the annexing officials. 8 Mandamus
might be used to compel the canvassing of votes where it is contended
that there were not sufficient votes. It might also be used in a negative
sense as has been done in Washington 6-- to compel an official not to
canvass an election return. Prohibition, however, would be the correct
procedure and should, therefore, be more often used to prevent unlaw-
ful continuation of annexation proceedings. Certiorari may be granted
in Washington to review municipal corporation proceedings. 70
Declaratory Judgment. Declaratory judgment is a new addition to
63 Drum v. University Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (1927).
See also, Sharkey v. City of Butte, 52 Mont. 16, 155 Pac. 266 (1916) ; Thurber v.
Henderson, 63 Ore. 410, 128 Pac. 43 (1912) ; Leach v. Port of Tillamook, 62 Ore. 345,
124 Pac. 642 (1912); City of Waco v. Higginson, 226 S.W. 1084 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920) ; Lum v. City of Bowie, 18 S.W. 142 (Tex. 1891).04 Smith v. Board of County Conm'rs Skagit County, 45 Fed. 725 (N.D. Wash.
1891) ; Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wn.2d 481, 236 P.2d 545 (1951) ; Wilton v. Pierce County, 61
Wash. 386, 112 Pac. 386 (1910).
65 Sharkey v. City of Butte, 52 Mont. 16, 155 Pac. 266 (1916) ; Smith v. Board of
County Comn'rs Skagit County, supra note 64.
6Couty of San Mateo v. City Council of Palo Alto, 168 Cal. App. 2d 220, 335
P.2d 1013 (1959) ; Jefferson Union School Dist. v. City Council of Sunnyvale 129
Cal. App. 2d 264, 277 P.2d 104 (1955) ; American Distilling Co. v. City Council of
Sausalito, 34 Cal.2d 660, 213 P.2d 704 (1950).
17 American Distilling Co. v. City Council of Sausilito, supra note 66.
68 County of San Mateo v. City Council of Palo Alto, 168 Cal. App. 2d 220, 335
P.2d 1013 (1959); City of Aneheim v. City of Fullerton, 102 Cal. App. 2d 395, 227
P.2d 494 (1951); City of Burlingame v. San Mateo County, 90 Cal. App. 2d 205, 203
P.2d 807 (1949).60 State ex rel. O'Connell v. Yelle, 51 Wn.2d 620, 320 P.2d 1086 (1958).
70 The court in State ex tel. Great No. Ry. v. Herschberger, 117 Wash. 275, 201
Pac. 2 (1921), granted a "writ of review" following an election and order by the
Board of County Commissioners for the incorporation of a municipality.
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the field of possible remedies. At first it received an unfavorable recep-
tion by the courts; it was bound by the limitations of the other col-
lateral remedies."' However, it has now been used instead of quo war-
ranto. The Oregon court, in Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. City of Esta-
cada," held that declaratory judgment may be used although quo
warranto might also be proper. In Arizona, declaratory judgment was
successfully used by an individual to test the constitutionality of the
statute authorizing annexation, but, upon a finding that the statute was
valid, further challenge was precluded. 3 This decision appears correct
since it does not extend the present restrictions on collateral attack by
individuals. On the other hand, declaratory judgment has been used
by a municipality"4 and by a county" to challenge the validity of an
annexation proceeding. It is suggested that unlike collateral attacks
by individuals, declaratory judgment actions should be extended to
governmental bodies since they represent more of the population and
have equal status with the municipality being attacked. A declaratory
judgment action was permitted in California"6 because California muni-
cipalities are given statutory authority to bring quo warranto, and
entertaining declaratory judgment did not enlarge the court's jurisdic-
tion. Accordingly, the City of Seattle has been permitted to use the
declaratory judgment action in Washington, 7 to determine the validity
of certain contracts by challenging the validity of the municipality.
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH COLLATERAL ATTAcK Is PEEMITTED
It is often stated that where an annexation proceeding has been
carried to completion by a municipality acting under at least the color
of authority, mere irregularities in the procedure will not clothe a
private individual with capacity to collaterally attack such annexa-
71 Selser v. City of Stuart, 135 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 769
(1943) ; Skinner v. City of Phoenix, 54 Ariz. 316, 95 P2d 424 (1939).
72 194 Ore. 145, 241 P.2d 1129 (1952).
T3 Skinner v. City of Phoenix, 54 Ariz. 316, 95 P.2d 424 (1939).
7 4 San Ysidro Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rep. 609, 365 P.2d 753
(1961).; State ex reL City of West Orange v. City of Orange, 300 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957); Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wn.2d
446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960); Town of Blooming Grove v. City of Madison, 275 Wis. 328,
81 N.W.2d 713 (1957); Town of Madison v. City of Madison, 269 Wis. 609, 70
N.W.2d 249 (1955).
7 5 Potvin v. Village of Chubbuck, 76 Idaho 453, 284 P.2d 414 (1955).
78 a Ysidro Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rep. 609, 365 P.2d 753
(1961).
7 7 Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 446, 357 P.2d
863 (1960).
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tion.8 The proper remedy in these circumstances must be a direct
proceeding by the state in the nature of a writ of quo warranto. The
following discussion will show under what circumstances an individual
may collaterally attack annexations, and the remedies available to him.
Annexation is treated as if it were the incorporation of a new munici-
pality consisting of the territory within the new boundaries. Therefore,
an attack upon the extension of corporate limits is believed to be an
attack upon the corporation's very existence. 9 Public policy demands
that only the state should be permitted to directly attack the municipal
existence by a quo warranto proceeding since it is the traditional pro-
ceeding used to question public existence. Collateral attacks, on the
other hand, are conclusive only as to the individual attacking, and
therefore cause a multiplicity of actions. Because of the reliance upon
the general acceptance of municipal existence,0 and because collateral
attacks usually result from a failure to contest annexation before com-
pletion, the courts generally seek to limit uncertainty by prohibiting
collateral attacks.
The rule against collateral attack is not applicable when annexation
is attacked on jurisdictional grounds or on the ground that the pro-
ceedings are void ab initio.81 Because no de facto corporation has been
created, such proceedings are always subject to attack. Equally
obvious, a suit seeking judicial declaration that particular property is
actually not within the boundaries of an annexation does not invoke the
rule.82 Such a suit admits the validity of the annexation and seeks only
an interpretation of it.
At an early date, the Washington court appeared to hold that an
individual never had capacity to collaterally attack a municipal cor-
78 Dixon v. City of Bremerton, 25 Wn.2d 508, 171 P.2d 243 (1946) ; Frace v. City
of Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69, 47 Pac. 219 (1896) (individual never has capacity to col-
laterally attack municipality); Kuhn v. City of Port Townsend, 12 Wash. 605, 41 Pac.
923 (1895) ; Ferguson v. City of Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 36 Pac. 969 (1894).
70 However, a few jurisdictions (not including Washington) find that challenging
a change of boundaries is not on the same plane as an attack against corporate exist-
ence. These jurisdictions demand direct proceedings only in the latter case. Dees v.
City of Lake Charles, 50 La. Ann. 356, 23 So. 382 (1898) ; Stoltman v. City of Clayton,
205 Mlo. App. 568, 226 S.W. 315 (1920) ; Lum v. City of Bowie, 18 S.W. 142 (Tex.
1891).80 Kuhn v. City of Port Townsend, 12 Wash. 605, 41 Pac. 923 (1895).
81 Sharkey v. City of Butte, 52 Mont. 16, 155 Pac. 266 (1916) ; Griffing Park v.
City of Port Arthur, 36 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Drum v. University
Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (1927); Wilton v. Pierce County,
61 Wash. 386, 112 Pac. 386 (1910).
3
2 Las Animas & S.j. Land Co. v. Preciado, 167 Cal. 580, 140 Pac. 239 (1914).
Contra, Saylor v. Town of Wallins, 220 Ky. 651, 295 S.W. 993 (1927).
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poration. 3 However, subsequent Washington cases8" have drawn from
equitable principles and have held that property owners have a suffi-
cient interest, arising from the threat of taxation and the exercise of
other municipal powers, to enable them to collaterally attack in two
circumstances. The first is the situation in which the proceeding has not
been completed. For example, in Davis v. Gibbs,8" the court enjoined
city officials from canvassing the votes in a special annexation election.
The second situation is after the completion of the annexation proceed-
ings but before or at the first exercise of the corporate franchise. For
lack of user, a de facto corporation has not arisen at this point, and
therefore, there is no reason to prohibit the individual from proceeding.
This rule, as first announced in other jurisdictions,"8 was followed in
Drum v. University Place Water Dist.,7 in which the court enjoined the
district by levying taxes against the petitioner's land.
DOCTRINE OF DE FACTO CORPORATION
The doctrine of de facto municipal corporations is similar to the
concept of private de facto corporations. In both cases the organiza-
tion has operated as though it were a valid corporation. Except for
the doctrine, having failed to comply with governing law, it would be
legally non-existent and its acts inoperative. The doctrine was devel-
oped to validate municipal action taken in these circumstances. Similar
to reincorporations of private corporations, it is applicable to municipal
annexations as well as incorporations. As a result, the principle that
the propriety of a de facto annexation cannot be collaterally attacked
by an individual, in the absence of statutory permission, has been
established.
The doctrine is examined in this comment because the selection of a
proper procedure by which to attack an annexation depends upon
whether a de facto corporation exists. The test for de facto existence
83 Frace v. City of Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69, 47 Pac. 219 (1896) ; Ferguson v. City of
Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 36 Pac. 969 (1894).8 4 Smith v. Board of County Comm'rs Skagit County, 45 Fed. 725 (N.D. Wash.
1891) ; Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wn.2d 481, 236 P2d 545 (1951) ; Wilton v. Pierce County, 61
Wash. 386, 112 Pac. 386 (1910). The same is true in other jurisdictions. American
Distilling Co. v. City Council of Sausalito, 34 Cal. 2d 660, 213 P.2d 704 (1950) ; City
of Sarasota v. Skillin, 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837 (1937) ; Sharkey v. City of Butte,
52 Mont. 16, 155 Pac. 266 (1916); Red River Valley Brick Co. v. City of Grand
Forks, 27 N.D. 8, 145 N.W. 725 (1914).
85 39 Wn.2d 481, 236 P.2d 545 (1951).
86 People v. Hausen, 276 Ill. 204, 114 N.E. 596 (1916) ; Hemple v. City of Hastings,
79 Neb. 723, 113 N.W. 187 (1907) ; In re Village of Spring Valley, 189 Misc. 324, 71
N.Y.S.2d 848 (1947); Jarl Co. v. Croton-on-Hudson, 234 App. Div. 788, 253 N.Y.
Supp. 999 (1931), aff'd, 258 N.Y. 303, 179 N.E. 708 (1932).
8T 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (1927).
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is, in fact, only an examination of the materiality of the alleged irregu-
larities of an annexation proceeding. In this section, various irregu-
larities are examined to provide a guide for determining materiality.
A defacto municipal corporation may be found where all of the
following factors exist:
1. A charter or general law which delegates authority to annex
territory;
2. An attempt to annex thereunder; and
3. Actual user of the corporate franchise.88
The rule derived from the first of these factors is that an attempt
to annex without authority from the state is void ab initio. Thus, the
question of de facto corporation does not arise where a municipality
attempts annexation under an unconstitutional statute since, not being
law, the statute delegates no authority. This can arise in two situations:
Where the statute under which the municipality is incorporated is
unconstitutional, and where the statute authorizing the annexation is
unconstitutional. The Washington court has been confronted with the
first situation." The court invalidated an annexation by the munici-
pality under the powers of a de facto corporation because the munici-
pality had been incorporated by special law which is prohibited by the
Washington Constitution.
On the other hand, it is argued that a municipality unchallenged by
the state should be deemed a de facto corporation, although operating
under an unconstitutional statute, for the reason that men have acted
in reliance on its validity and should be protected on that account."0
The Washington court appears to have applied this reasoning in one
case. 1 The court found that a de facto corporation existed although
the city proved that it had incorporated under an unconstitutional
statute. The doctrine was applied to prevent the city from denying that
its tax claim against an individual who had relied on its corporate
existence had been barred by the Statute of Limitations. 2
The Washington rule is that before there can be substantial compli-
88 Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 13 (1902); Drum v. University
Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585, 258 Pac. 505 (1927).80 Denver v. Spokane Falls, 7 Wash. 226, 34 Pac. 926 (1893).
00 1 DiLLoN, MUNICiPAL CoapoRAmiows § 67 (5th ed. 1911).
01 City of Ballard v. West Coast Improvement Co., 15 Wash. 572, 46 Pac. 1055
(1896).
02 The Spokane Falls and West Coast Improvement Co. cases are inconsistent. They
are, however, old cases and most likely will not arise again. Perhaps the most logical
distinction is that in the West Coast Improvement Co. case the municipality attempted
to use the unconstitutionality to defeat an otherwise valid defense that the statute of
limitations barred its foreclosure on street assessments.
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ance, there must be some attempt to comply with the statute. 3 In one
case, " the court found that a notice printed in a newspaper outside the
territory proposed to be annexed was substantial compliance where
there was no available newspaper within it. The court held that the
statute's purpose was to furnish the voters with adequate notice, to be
accomplished in a manner as consistent with the literal terms of the
statute as possible.
Substantial compliance has also been found in Washington where
no notice of the opening of the registration poll books was given, but
where there was proof that all but a few hundred of the total voters
in the territory had voted;95 where surplus instructions on how to vote
were added to the ballot, but which the court found aided rather than
misled the voting;9" and where the commissioners designated polling
places as required by statute but failed to give notice of them, the
court finding no statutory duty to do so." Also, on proof that no one
had been misled, substantial compliance has been found although a
ballot erroneously stated the date on which the commissioners adopted
the boundaries, as required by statute; 8 and where the number of
inhabitants was omitted from a petition.9
On the other hand, there is a lack of substantial compliance when a
procedure's quality of fairness is affected by irregularities. For this
reason, the failure to correctly describe the boundaries of a proposed
municipality has been deemed a material irregularity."' The court held
that the statutory requirement that a notice describe the boundaries was
to afford those affected by the proceeding an opportunity to appear and
be heard. The irregularity denied them this right. In Brown's Estate
v. City of West Seattle,' municipal officials proceeded with a special
election for annexation despite the issuance and publication of a
restraining order. This was held to be grounds for invalidating the
election unless the officials could show that there had been a full, free
and fair expression by the voters at the election.
93 Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wn.2d 481, 485, 236 P.2d 545, 547 (1951).94 Brown's Estate v. City of West Seattle, 43 Wash. 26, 85 Pac. 854 (1906).
05 Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 308, 126 Pac. 628, 633-34 (1912).
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 446, 451, 357
P.2d 863, 867 (1960).
99 Smith v. Board County Comm'rs Skagit County, 45 Fed. 725 (N.D. Wash. 1891).100 State ex reL Great No. Ry. v. Herschberger, 117 Wash. 275, 201 Pac. 2 (1921).
10143 Wash. 26, 85 Pac. 854 (1906).
102 Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wn.2d 481, 236 P.2d 545 (1951).
10 Wilton v. Pierce County, 61 Wash. 386, 112 Pac. 386 (1910).
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Substantial compliance is also lacking where no attempt to proceed
properly has been made. Thus, the Washington court has found no
substantial compliance where publication of statutory notice was pos-
sible but not carried out;0 2 and where, although more convenient for
the voters, voting precincts were re-established contrary to general
election laws." 3 In other jurisdictions, where annexation was attempted
without the approval of the voters of the proposed territory,04 and
where carried out contrary to a constitutional prohibition against
amending a charter more often than every two years,05 substantial
compliance has been found not to exist.
Although a portion of a proceeding may be materially irregular,
the entire proceeding need not be invalid. It was held in State ex rel.
Cummings v. Blackwel °' that an incorporation proceeding was not
invalid because territory was included which should not have been
included. Thus, an annexation which includes territory not annexable
-for instance, an annexation ordinance which inadvertently includes
more territory than described in the petition for annexation-would
be void as to the excess but not as to the territory described by the
petition. This rule, however, appears to be limited to the physical quan-
tities of the annexation proceeding, as exemplified by the Blackwell
case, since no other cases have been found regarding this point.
Regarding the third factor, an action collaterally attacking an
annexation may be barred by estoppel, laches, prescription, or statutory
prohibition. Of these four grounds, only estoppel and laches are
applicable to the doctrine of de facto corporation. However, the latter
two are also discussed here because their effect of barring collateral
attack is similar. Thus far, the Washington court has invalidated
attacks on all but the last ground. Where the appellant participated in
the annexation proceedings, acquiesced in the result reached and for
three years recognized the jurisdiction of the city, he was barred from
asserting his rights, the court reasoning that to allow an attack after
such long acquiescence would create excessive confusion." 7 Collateral
attacks have been barred by estoppel and laches in subsequent Wash-
ington cases03 as well as in other jurisdictions." 9
104 Leach v. Port of Tillamook, 62 Ore. 345, 124 Pac. 642 (1912).
'Or City of Waco v. Higginson, 226 S.W. 1084 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
100 91 Wash. 81, 157 Pac. 223 (1916).
107 Kuhn v. City of Port Townsend, 12 Wash. 605, 41 Pac. 923 (1895).
108 Dixon v. City of Bremerton, 25 Wn.2d 508, 171 P.2d 243 (1946) ; Frace v. City
of Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69, 47 Pac. 219 (1896).
109 People v. McKinnie, 277 Ill. 342, 115 N.E. 526 (1917) (city for several years
made street and sewer improvements and exercised general jurisdiction) ; Saylor v.
1962]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Prescription is an exceptional instance in which, even though a de
facto corporation does not exist, collateral attack is barred.1 Prescrip-
tion is to be distinguished from estoppel and laches since it acts to bar
collateral attacks on corporations void ab initio, whereas the latter bars
attacks only on de facto corporations. Thus, a Missouri court"' held
that a collateral attack on a city which had exercised its jurisdiction for
twenty-five years was barred, although there was no record of an ordi-
nance extending its boundaries. The Washington court has reversed
the concept and barred the city from denying that it was a municipality
although it asserted that the statute under which it had incorporated
had been declared unconstitutional. 12
There is no statute of limitations in Washington which bars proceed-
ings brought to challenge annexations. California, on the other hand,
has a statute which bars proceedings brought later than three months
after annexation proceedings have been completed. Under this statute,
the California court1 3 held that even the state was barred from bringing
quo warranto. The court reasoned that since quo warranto proceedings
were the only way to attack the validity of an annexation, the statute,
by necessary implication, applied to the state. This, however, is not
the usual result; the common law rule was that the state cannot be
barred by a statute of limitations, from seeking a writ of quo war-
ranto."' Sometimes, however-because individuals initiate quo war-
ranto proceedings by petitioning the Attorney General-a distinction
has been drawn between a proceeding in which the public is interested
and one purely in the interest of the relator, 15 and where the latter
exists, the state is given no greater powers than the relator has when he
is collaterally attacking annexation. Under such circumstances the
state may be barred on grounds of estoppel, laches, and the statute
of limitations.
Town of Wallins, 220 Ky. 651, 295 S.W. 993 (1927) (suit to correct town boundaries
not begun until seven years had elapsed after incorporation); State v. Village of
College View, 88 Neb. 232, 129 N.W. 296 (1911) (relator permitted streets to be
graded and sidewalks to be installed).
110 Prescription, analogous to adverse possession, arises from long, continued user
and conduct as a municipality.
11 Central Missouri Oil Co. v. City of St. James, 232 Mo. App. 142, 111 S.W.2d
215 (1937).
112 City of Ballard v. West Coast Improvement Co., 15 Wash. 572, 46 Pac. 1055
(1896).
113 People v. Los Angeles, 93 Cal. App. 532, 269 Pac. 934 (1928). See also People
ex rel. Forde v. Town of Corte Madera, 115 Cal. App. 2d 321, 251 P.2d 988 (1952).
"- People v. Anderson, 239 Ill. 266, 87 N.E. 1019 (1909); State v. School Dist.
No. 9 of Tillamook County, 148 Ore. 273, 36 P2d 179 (1934).
. "15Ibid.
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SUMMARY
Urban growth has not yet become a problem in Washington, but it is
likely that it will in the near future. As its population grows, annex-
ations will occur more frequently. If its population should increase as
rapidly as has been the case in California, problems of annexability
and procedural irregularities will undoubtedly occur under the present
Washington annexation statutes. The court will someday have to
define the limits of the word "contiguous" as annexations of mushroom-
shaped territory are challenged and inter-county annexations are
attacked. The various 1961 legislative criteria for determining whether
annexations are in the public interest have not been interpreted, and
whether one criterion is more important than another is unknown.
The majority of annexation cases in Washington have arisen because
of procedural irregularities. The court has basically blocked out the
doctrine of substantial compliance. The irregularity must not have
occurred by deliberate disregard for the procedure prescribed by
statute nor have resulted in unfair treatment. It must have been
done in a bona fide attempt to comply with statutory procedure.
One attempting to collaterally attack an annexation must be pre-
pared to show that a de facto corporation has not been created. He
must be prepared to meet the defenses of estoppel, laches and prescrip-
tion. Before an annexing municipality exercises its corporate franchise,
it may be challenged by proceedings in the form of injunction, manda-
mus, prohibition and certiorari. On the other hand, the remedies avail-
able for attacking a de facto corporation are limited. Quo warranto is
the traditional proceeding. Declaratory judgment has been allowed
in some cases, but except for declaratory judgments brought by govern-
mental bodies such as counties and municipalities, it has been and
should be deemed a collateral attack.
JOHN E. IVERSON
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